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             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
             FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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                RICHMOND DIVISION
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    DONNA K. SOUTTER,
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        on behalf of herself and
        those similarly situated,
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                    Plaintiffs,
                                     : Civil Action
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                                     : No. 3:10CV107
    EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
                                     : May 4, 2011
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                   Defendant. :
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           COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF CONFERENCE CALL
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            BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE
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                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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     APPEARANCES: (All via telephone)
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                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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(The conference call in this matter commenced at 1:34 p.m.)

THE COURT: Hello. This is Soutter against Equifax, No. 3:10CV107. Who's here for whom starting with counsel for the plaintiff?

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is Leonard
Bennett for the plaintiff. Also on the line are my
cocounsel, Dale Pittman and Matthew Erausquin.

MR. GOHEEN: Your Honor, Barry Goheen and Tony Love for Equifax. Also John Montgomery on the phone for Equifax.

THE COURT: All right. This is a status conference to consider how we're going to proceed henceforth in this matter, the case having been certified.

I have received suggestions from each side. The plaintiff's suggestions, proposed schedule and procedures for class notification, for completing discovery, and to set a trial date is Docket No. 94. And the defendant's objections and its own suggestions, alternatively, is Docket No. 95, and I have read that as well.

And then the plaintiff has set forth another one, docket No. 100. What's this all about,

Mr. Bennett? I've got one from Mr. Goheen. It's

Docket No. 95, and it's April the 11th. And I've got

one from Mr. Goheen, Docket No. 98, and it's dated May

the 3rd, which is yesterday. Then one from you dated

May the 3rd.

Are these, No. 98 and No. 100, the final proposed versions of these things? Is that what we have here?

MR. BENNETT: That's correct, Judge. And in the interim, the Court will recall, the original order had set a deadline of April 11 to file the parties' position.

During that interim, we were already certainly engaged with defense counsel, not adversarially, that is we were attempting to meet and confer properly between the two parties but had not succeeded or determined whether that would be possible, whether an agreed outcome would be possible, and subsequent to that we continued that process with the defendant having informed us off docket of their respective positions, our side having done the same.

After really the last person to person or telephonic meet-and-confer call there were significant differences that are fleshed out in respective filings. The defendant filed -- really the last two

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filings crossed paths, so they are not directly responsive to one another. But Equifax filed its opposition to our proposal. We in our more recent filing adapted it to accommodate a couple of the matters that they had raised and to attach the notice that we had sent them at the end of last week.

The defendant has also communicated this morning some additional concerns to us that had not been incorporated within either parties respective positions to the Court.

MR. GOHEEN: Your Honor, this is Barry Goheen. Just to follow-up. I think Mr. Bennett has set it forth accurately. If I would just kind of flesh out just a tad. I think the filings Your Honor mentioned a few moments ago that were dated in April were, for lack of a better term, I guess one might call them conditional. The status conference was continued until today. I think it was April 13, and I think that was because of maybe conflicts we had, and we certainly appreciate the Court's indulgence in that, but I think we were, both sides, both plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Bennett and his team, and our team for Equifax, had filed what we filed, as Mr. Bennett said, in seeking to comply with the Court's original order in advance of that April 13

date. Once the continuance of this conference was made official and sent through, we then, and Mr. Bennett did point out and he's right, we met and conferred, and not surprisingly there were some things we agreed on and some things we had differences on, but I would suggest yesterday's filings, which he's right, pretty much crossed paths or pretty much came one after another on the filings, do reflect the latest and probably, I would say at least from Equifax's point of view, the operative proposed plan from our side anyway, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Well, I've read all four of them. I just wanted to make sure. It looked to me like you-all weren't really very far apart from what you filed in April in how to proceed and on what timetable to proceed.

MR. GOHEEN: I do think, Your Honor -- this is Barry Goheen again for Equifax. I do think there are some agreements. I think we've had some productive communications.

I believe that the parties are in agreement on the length of the discovery, if you will, the discovery period, as well as the post dispositive motions schedule following that, and I think that's

where we do have some common ground.

And I think that we're on other issues. And notice, for example, there are some things that we, again, agree with on the proposed notice. There are others that we communicated to Mr. Bennett some kind of larger areas of agreement without getting into flyspecking the line item thing, but I do believe we have found some common ground.

THE COURT: I don't have a notice here. Have you all actually given a notice in here that I don't have?

MR. BENNETT: The plaintiff has proposed one that's attached to Docket No. 100, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But that's not the one -- you don't agree on it?

MR. BENNETT: No, sir.

MR. GOHEEN: Right. This is Barry Goheen.

Your Honor. This is something Mr. Bennett proposed in his filing of yesterday was that he did send that as pointed out on last Friday afternoon, which is

April 29, and proposed for Equifax to respond in one week, and then assuming the parties cannot work out their differences to meet and confer, and then submit their proposals to the Court. I believe it says May 9 here.

We believe it can be a little bit longer than that to respond. But in any event, that's the reason there's been one submitted and only one proposal submitted to the Court.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is

Mr. Bennett. If the Court would accommodate this, I

believe I could -- there are really three disputes

that appear to be causing the greatest difficulty

between the parties, and a number of the matters, the

process matters, the scheduling, the length of time

for preparation and those types of matters, we have

worked or will be able to work out, but the three

matters that seem to be causing the great difficulty,
I think, are as follows:

The first is that there is a different opinion between the parties that's actually reflected in the appellate briefing about what your order and memo and class definition mean.

THE COURT: I haven't read your appellate -I've got a copy of it, but I haven't read it.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor. If I could summarize. One of the arguments, if the Court recalls the class certification argument in the briefing before the district court, there's a question of how you accommodate the individuals that want to or

believe that they could prove causation significant actual damages.

And we advocated, and I believed, as our -we had an alternate position, which we abandoned, and
at the hearing advocated that if you have actual
damages, your remedy is to opt out of the class. And
that is reflected. The Court so ruled. And that is
reflected in the Court's memorandum.

The order doesn't contain the explanation that this court included within the memorandum. And thus, the defendant has taken the position that what your order means is that class members will have to make an individualized election as to whether or not they have actual damages over a thousand dollars and that that election based on the way your order is drafted could occur at any time including after judgment, after trial.

We have taken the position that what your order, the way that this court interpreted that order, as outlined in the memorandum, is that by not opting out they have -- the class member has elected not to pursue those damages greater than \$1,000.

And, again, you haven't read the appellate briefing, but that's one of the four arguments that are at issue is this different opinion as to what this

arguing that it means that if you do not opt out, you have elected not to pursue actual damages greater than \$1,000, and the defendant arguing that there is this separate stage that this court contemplated where at some point later, and it argued at some undeterminable time, it could be even at the end of the case, the class member could elect to -- could assert that it has damages greater than \$1,000. And this becomes difficult because in the meet-and-confer process, the class notice, the defendant has taken the position that our class notice needs to incorporate a separate non-opt out related process for the, as it calls, self election for actual damages.

And we very much disagreed that that's what this Court's order says, but, of course, I'm the plaintiff, and they're the defendant, and Your Honor is the Court.

The second issue, if the Court please, is -THE COURT: Well, the order doesn't say
anything about opting out one way or the other.

MR. BENNETT: No, sir.

THE COURT: That's because you-all need to put all that in the notice.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir, but the question is,

do we also, in addition to the opting out, does the Court contemplate that there would be really a separate independent procedure, separate and apart from the opt out, where class members would prove their actual damages for class membership.

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We believe this is a tactical misread of the Court's order. The defendant's position has remained that the class can't be identifiable on appeal, so they are taking the position now similarly that this Court's order contemplated a procedure separate and apart from the opt out procedure whereby a determination would be made as to class membership based on actual damages. And our belief is, our interpretation of the order, is that, and informed by the memorandum, is that when a class member stays in the class, it does not opt out. They have made that election. They stay in the class. They cannot get actual damages greater than \$1,000. And if they opt out, they can do whatever they choose.

THE COURT: Mr. Goheen.

MR. GOHEEN: Your Honor, obviously, I don't think the Court would want to hear me argue on class cert, but to respond to that briefly, I don't think there's quite as big a disagreement on that as I was hearing from Mr. Bennett.

The issue, and it sounds like he's limiting that to just the draft notice, and we did raise that issue in our comments on his notice, and we communicated with him already, but the Court's order, I'm looking at it right now, and this is the order, not the memorandum, and I'm not going to get into the whole class definition because it is a little lengthy, but it does say which persons suffered actual damages of less than \$1,000 as a result of a report by Equifax that did not accurately report that the judgment had been satisfied, appealed or vacated.

The issue is in the notice that needs to be in the notice. I don't see that there is any -- that there is any reference to that in the notice. It seems to me that a fundamental part of a class notice is to provide the class definition, whatever it is, and that is not in the notice.

So whether we get into positions on they need to prove them or it's a fluid thing that we had in our brief, and so forth and so on, regardless of whatever is in the 23(f) petition, they get a point for notice, which is what we're talking about right now is that that needs to be disclosed to class members.

If a class member believes the person has

actual damages, to quote the order, actual damages of less than \$1,000 as a result of a report by Equifax that did not accurately report that the judgment had been disposed of, then that person is in the class.

If a consumer has belief he or she has actual damages of more than \$1,000, my reading anyway, that person is not in the class. And I just think the notice would want to reflect that.

THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, what are you talking about doing in this case for people who suffered actual damages of less than \$1,000? What happens if a person says that?

MR. BENNETT: I'm sorry. Are you asking the plaintiff?

THE COURT: Yes, you, Mr. Bennett.

MR. BENNETT: Judge, if they opt out, then they cannot pursue --

THE COURT: That's not the question. The question is what about people who don't opt out and say they have damages between 0 and \$1,000 actual damages?

MR. BENNETT: Judge, we don't contemplate and did not read your memo and your order to seek an election of individuals to make a statement to us or to the Court that they -- as to what their actual

damages are. We're seeking statutory damage remedy.

THE COURT: I didn't ask you that. What I asked you is what do you propose to do about these actual damages of less than \$1,000?

MR. BENNETT: We don't propose to do anything, Judge. We propose to seek statutory damages.

THE COURT: The purpose of your suggestion about suffering actual damages of less than \$1,000 as a limit was what?

MR. BENNETT: Because statutory damages at that point, Judge, are offered within the statue as a proxy or as an alternative to those actual damages.

If the defendant concedes, that is the purpose of the statutory damage remedy is that it is an alternative remedy when actual damages are below \$1,000.

THE COURT: So why do we need that language in the class definition at all?

MR. BENNETT: I don't believe we need it in the class definition, Judge, but to the extent that it was included within the class definition, we believe that Your Honor informed the parties in the memorandum that the election to stay in the class meant that they were not going to be able to pursue their actual damages.

1 THE COURT: Are you of the view that that 2 language ought to not be in the class certification 3 language? MR. BENNETT: Well --4 THE COURT: Which person suffered actual 5 6 damages of less than \$1,000? 7 MR. BENNETT: I believe, Judge, it's unnecessary. I don't believe it's incorrect. 8 9 THE COURT: I thought we got it from you. 10 thought that language came from you in your briefs. 11 MR. BENNETT: Judge, it --12 THE COURT: Yeah, it did, didn't it? 13 MR. BENNETT: Well, we offered a second alternative, Judge. 14 15 THE COURT: Why do you keep doing that? don't you just do the right thing and quit creating 16 problems of alternatives. Why don't we just take that 17 18 language out of there? What does that do in the case? 19 MR. BENNETT: It doesn't do anything in the 20 case, Judge. THE COURT: Mr. Goheen? 21 22 MR. GOHEEN: I think that came from their 23 briefs. We certainly have argued that, and I don't 24 believe it does anything. That's Your Honor's 25 question, so I think it does seem to be an

appendage -- an unnecessary appendage, excuse me.

THE COURT: Why don't I do an order amending the class definition to take out "which" and see how it would read then? It would just be a period after unpaid; is that right?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that what you're saying,

Mr. Goheen?

MR. GOHEEN: I'm reading it as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, take a minute and read it.

MR. GOHEEN: As I understand it, Your Honor, maybe Mr. Bennett is better to respond to this, we take that out, so the definition is going to include, and, again, I'm not going to read it all, but it will close with "At a time when any Virginia General District Court or Circuit Court judgment" --

THE COURT: Slow down, Mr. Goheen. Start all over. You're going too fast.

MR. GOHEEN: I'm sorry. I apologize. I was a problem I had in the hearing, as I recall.

I'll just read the whole thing up to the period. This is off the order. "All natural persons for whom Equifax's records note that a credit report was

furnished to a third party who requested the credit report in connection with an application for credit on or after February 17, 2008, to February 17, 2010, other than for an employment purpose at a time when any Virginia General District Court or Circuit Court judgment that had been satisfied, appealed or vacated in the court file more than 30 days earlier was reported in Equifax's file as remaining unpaid," period.

THE COURT: Is that what you think needs to be done, Mr. Bennett?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: Now, wait. Don't talk. Every time you say something, it gets more convoluted.

Mr. Goheen, is that what you think needs to be done?

MR. GOHEEN: I believe that it does cure one of the issues that is we had, yes. I think that was one of the things we argued was the point Mr. Bennett was raising, which was how do we know someone has less than or more than \$1,000. That's a self-identification point, I guess, for lack of a better term.

THE COURT: I'm kind of inclined to believe that I was trying to solve the problem that you raised

by taking the solution that Mr. Bennett suggested and it may have created more problems than it solved actually, I guess, but the notice would clearly have to say also that you're not pursuing actual damages, isn't that right, Mr. Bennett?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir, it would have to say that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOHEEN: I think that was to go back to where this part of the discussion started, Your Honor. I think that was our point, that the draft didn't. Maybe it did.

THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. That was the point you were saying it needed to deal with. All right.

All right. I think that after talking with you-all the right thing to do is to amend the class certification notice to put a period after the word "unpaid" in that paragraph and delete the language "which person suffered actual damages of less than \$1,000 as a result of a report by Equifax that did not accurately report that the judgment had been satisfied, appealed or vacated, period. And that would come out.

Since I haven't read the appeal papers, I

have no idea what that does to your appeal, but I'm sure you can straighten that out in your subsequent briefing with the Court of Appeals.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And then if they don't like what was done, they will at least know that maybe there isn't this issue involved or whatever it is that you-all conclude that comes from that. But for our purposes, I think that's the solution, and that's what I will do. And I'll just simply report having conferred with counsel and concluding on the basis of their views that it's proper so to do, that order is amended to read, and just retype the whole order with that out of there. Okay? Or the class notice, class definition would read that way.

I do think it needs to be in the notice that people are not going to be getting any actual damages if they think they had actual damages.

All right? Now, let's move on.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir. The second issue regards the timing of both the start of discovery and of the class notice or a list generation process.

Both discovery and the class list generation process will take some time, and the plaintiffs' view is that the parties need to start that right away.

The defendant holds the view that it would like either an actual or de facto stay of anything in this case until after a disposition of the Rule 23(f) appeal that it has lodged in the Fourth Circuit.

THE COURT: When is your brief due on that?

MR. BENNETT: It's already briefed, Judge,

and, historically, the last two times Equifax filed a

23(f), they were denied within about a two- to

three-month window of time. Similarly in our Williams

case.

THE COURT: Well, the problem I have is that the timing that you're dealing with now has the Court basically gone after this month. They don't sit anymore after this month until September.

MR. GOHEEN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Goheen for Equifax, if I may. This is the exact timing on that. The petition was filed on behalf of Equifax on April 13, 2011. Plaintiff, through its counsel here on the call, responded or filed the response to the petition on April 27. So I think that was last week. So it is now pending as Mr. Bennett just said.

THE COURT: Have you filed a reply?

MR. GOHEEN: There is not a provision for a reply, and no, we're not --

THE COURT: There is a provision for a reply

if they ask you for it, isn't it?

MR. GOHEEN: I believe that would be the only basis, Your Honor, and that has not been requested by the Court at least as of the present time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOHEEN: So if it turns out that the Court is not in session through or, I'm sorry, after May, that was news to me, obviously I'd defer to the Court's experience, of course, on that, and I was unaware of that, but that is the issue, and to follow-up on --

THE COURT: Mr. Goheen, their last argument session is May 10 through 13, and then it resumes again September 20 through 23.

MR. GOHEEN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me see. I'm going to the docket to see if there's anything on the docket about this issue. There wasn't when I looked at it before, but I looked at it -- I think I would have noticed it, but I wasn't looking for this.

MR. GOHEEN: What I've been advised is that it seems consistent, I think, with what Mr. Bennett maybe just said is that the Fourth Circuit's history is that it tends to be rather prompt, but usually within the 30 to 60-day time frame that it will

dispose of 23(f) petitions for the very reason we're having this discussion right now. If the case continues to end in the District Court and whether proceedings are stayed or partial or no stay, the bottom line is it's difficult to manage two courts. So I think that's part of what we've tried to set forth in our papers that we submitted yesterday.

The other issue is, and this probably is something Mr. Bennett was getting to perhaps on his third issue, is that this is going to be in addition to a rather time consuming process, particularly with regards to class list, which he just mentioned. It's also going to be rather intensive.

THE COURT: Mr. Goheen, we are losing a lot of your communication. You're sort of breaking off at the end of some words, and I don't know what it is, but it's hard for me to hear, and I'm sure it's hard for the court reporter. Are you on a squawk box?

MR. GOHEEN: I apologize. I took the handset. Does that sound better?

THE COURT: Yes, it does.

MR. GOHEEN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. I'm on the handset because Mr. Love and I are in a conference room. That's why we were on the speaker phone, but I'll pick up that handset.

THE COURT: Well, you are still crackling some.

MR. GOHEEN: I'm going to do the best that I can, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOHEEN: I'll try to speak a little more loudly.

(Unintelligible) for preparing or generating, compiling, if you will, the class list is going to be a rather lengthy process, as Mr. Bennett just suggested, in terms of time, but it's also going to be fairly expensive, and we're not talking about millions of dollars, but we are talking about pretty substantial costs, and I think there's going to be disagreement on who bears those costs. But that issue aside for the moment, it is rather expensive, and we believe that that would also -- at least counsel -- and I'm waiting to us see what the Fourth Circuit is going to do or at least giving the Fourth Circuit a little time, say, until maybe the end of May, if that's when the Court is going to break for an extended period to see what the Fourth Circuit does.

Obviously (unintelligible.)

THE COURT: We're losing you. I don't know what it is. For instance, when you say "process," we

lose everything. When you say "deny," as I think that's what you were saying, we lost everything but the D sound. I don't know what's happening.

MR. GOHEEN: I'm having difficulty hearing the Court as well.

THE COURT: You are? How did this call get going?

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is a private conference call bridge, and the parties have called into it, and we have three-wayed Your Honor in.

THE COURT: Why don't you get them back on the line and start again? If he's having trouble hearing me and I'm having trouble hearing him, we've got a problem.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor. We can either call you back or I'd suggest maybe Mr. Goheen calls in. You know, hangs up and calls into the --

THE COURT: Would you try that, Mr. Goheen, because I think you need to hear what I'm saying as well as I need to hear what you're saying?

MR. GOHEEN: Okay. What are you suggesting?

THE COURT: I think Mr. Bennett says you hang up and dial back in.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, that's what I'm suggesting.

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             MR. GOHEEN: All right. We'll try that and
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    come right back.
             THE COURT: All right. Let's see what
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    happens.
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             MR. MONTGOMERY: Mr. Goheen, if you could do
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    it from another line, perhaps it might be helpful. It
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    seems like it might be your phone that you're using.
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             MR. GOHEEN: Okay. That's a good idea, John.
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    We'll try that.
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             THE COURT:
                        Hello.
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             MR. GOHEEN: Hello.
             THE COURT: Is this Mr. Goheen?
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             MR. GOHEEN: Yes, Your Honor. Better?
             THE COURT: No, not really. Talk a little
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    bit and let's see. Recite the Declaration of
    Independence or something.
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             MR. GOHEEN: I was going to say, Your Honor,
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    that I went to the Final Four, and I was pretty
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    freaking disappointed in Kentucky.
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             THE COURT: Well, I was, too. We're still
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    having some of the same problem, I think.
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             MR. GOHEEN: Well --
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             THE COURT: Are you having the same problem
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    with me?
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MR. GOHEEN: Yes, Your Honor, and when Mr.

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Bennett was talking right before I disconnected a few minutes ago, he was going in and out as well.

THE COURT: I don't know who it is, but I've had calls on this telephone today and I haven't had the problem. So, Mr. Bennett, get hold of your facility. We'll all hang up and you get us back in.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

(Brief recess taken.)

THE COURT: Hello.

MR. GOHEEN: Judge, this is Barry Goheen.

Does that sound any better?

THE COURT: That's a whole lot better for me. How about for you?

MR. GOHEEN: Better on our end, and I understand from Mr. Bennett and the other participants telephonically it's better for them as well.

THE COURT: All right. Good.

MR. GOHEEN: I apologize for that, Your Honor. I want to, obviously, go back through what the Court was having difficulty hearing.

THE COURT: I think we've got most of it.

The bottom line is that we don't know when the Fourth

Circuit is going to act, but they generally try on

these to act fairly quickly on these matters when they are briefed. They send them to a panel. And it may be that next week when they're here they'll kind of confer over it and decide it next week.

MR. GOHEEN: Based on -- this is Barry Goheen again. Based on what Your Honor said with regard to the schedule, I would be extremely surprised if the Court in going into some sort of a break after this month or after some point this month that the petition would not be ruled upon one way or another by the time the Court broke for the reasons that we've just been discussing.

THE COURT: They also, though, Mr. Goheen, it's not unusual that these panels will adjourn without making decisions, not just these, but on any interim matter, and they'll continue to focus on them whether the court has sessions or not. They don't just take off and stop work, although some of them, the judges take off, but I think this court is pretty careful about trying to manage its docket and handle things as expeditiously as they can.

So I don't think that's a problem. We're not looking at a forever time frame. That's for sure.

MR. GOHEEN: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But on the other hand, I'm

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concerned about delay, and I don't know why we can't get started with the case, and then if the Court grants the appeal, I think it's appropriate to stop the case, but you need to get going with the class list.

How are you going to get the class list? Judge, this was the third MR. BENNETT: The proposal we have for the class list is the issue. plaintiff will hire a company called Rust, which was actually the administrator that was used in the Williams v. LexisNexis case. There are a number of others approved in the Eastern District of Virginia, but it's seen as the gold standard of administration companies. It costs a little bit more, but they have significant experience in actually putting together from disparate databases class list information. our proposal had been one -- and we offered what we thought was a cooperative proposal, and Equifax opposed it, so in our more recent filing we have offered an alternative that isn't dependent on Equifax's cooperation.

The first suggestion we have, and the purpose would be to minimize burden on the defendant, would be that Rust would be retained and paid by the plaintiff but responsible to the Court, as the notice process

is, would meet with a responsible person or person responsible at Equifax for its archive database and put together a computer protocol that will minimize the burden on Equifax while generating an accurate class list. The defendant opposes providing any person to interact with Rust.

So our alternative, which is supported by the rules, is that Equifax will provide a mirror electronic copy of its archive, and Rust will then use that data to generate the class list.

We want to go back to the Virginia Supreme

Court only one time just because we don't want to be

disruptive and overly burden that third party, that

non-party, but that Rust would then have the data from

the two databases and use on a system-wide basis the

extraction and matching system that we believe is very

successful on the sampling basis precertification.

To simplify, our position is either the defendant cooperates and maintains complete ownership and control over its data, it asserts certainly a business interest in that control, and we work to minimize its burden, or alternately if it continues to oppose and, we think, obstruct, then we don't necessarily have to have anything to do with the defendant. It just turns over those searchable

archives, and we have Rust do the extraction.

Equifax doesn't want to turn over its database. We understand why. So we have tried to come up with an alternative that gives its executives piece of mind knowing that it has maintained full control over that database. But to the extent that Equifax begins to, we believe, manufacture or contrive, and our belief is based on actual discovery, not just supposition, internal expenses or costs that it is asserting for extracting or doing searches of its archive, we believe that the proper way to generate the list, the least expensive way, and the way in which the generation --

THE COURT: Will you do me a favor, Mr.

Bennett, and quite larding the statement up? Just get

me to the bottom line of what the proposal is without

all the argument, without all the parentheticals.

Just get right to it so I can follow. You all are so

far ahead of me in your knowledge base it's not

helpful to get all these deviations. So give me

exactly what you're saying you want to do.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

Either Equifax extracts the archived monthly files because it maintains a report on every consumer snapshotted on a monthly basis.

THE COURT: That's a lot of parentheticals.

Cut it down and tell me exactly what you want done leaving the parentheticals out.

MR. BENNETT: I want Equifax, Judge, to either (A) provide the monthly snapshots for all consumers with Virginia judgments in them so that Rust can then overlay them with the Supreme Court data or (B) I want Equifax to provide to Rust under a protective order a mirror copy of its full archive database so that Rust will do the searches and extraction and generate the list in the same way.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Mr. Goheen.

MR. GOHEEN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Goheen.
Mr. Love will respond to a lot of those details, but
let me quickly just touch on one thing. Mr. Bennett
mentioned if someone within Equifax working with Rust
or whoever the class administrator is, he's correct
that in a prior communication we did resist that. I
did resist that. And we continue to do so to the
extent that it's someone who's devoted, I think we put
this in our papers, too, if someone's, essentially,
nine to five job would be working with Rust, but the
crux of the situation, as I mentioned a moment ago --

THE COURT: Mr. Goheen, you are getting down

and you're getting Bennettitis.

MR. GOHEEN: Oh, no.

THE COURT: Yes, you are, and that's a bad thing for you.

Do you want to do the first choice, the snapshot of the Virginia judgments at X point in time, whatever we're talking about, or give out all archives? Which do you want to do?

MR. GOHEEN: I'm going to let Mr. Love handle that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I want the answer first.

MR. LOVE: Equifax is unwilling, and I'll explain why.

THE COURT: I don't need any parentheticals.

You're getting Bennettitis, too. I'll give you a

chance to do that. I need to understand the issues

first, Mr. Love. Which do you want to do of those

two?

MR. LOVE: Equifax would not want to do either of those, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me what you want to do without a bunch of sidebar, and once I get the issues organized, we can deal with the reasons. What is it you want to do?

MR. LOVE: Equifax has offered to give

Plaintiff 24 months of frozen scan data in electronic format. Equifax has indicated that there is a substantial cost associated with that, which is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. We have conveyed Equifax's offer to plaintiff.

We would have to agree with what the search criteria were going to be for that 24 months of frozen scan data. Even if we get past the cost issue, we would have to agree. For example, Mr. Bennett said that his wish list A was monthly snapshots of Virginia consumers with a judgment on their file.

Well, when Equifax searches for this type of information, it has to create a program like a computer program that searches for certain criteria. The more criteria you search for and the more nuanced it becomes, the more expensive it becomes, and the more time consuming it becomes, and the more complex it becomes.

For example, would we be searching for consumers who only have a current Virginia address on file or would we be searching for consumers who ever had a Virginia address on their file? That is but one example of what makes this type of search complex.

THE COURT: It's the kind of search that people do all the time all over the world in all kinds

of businesses. The question is how do you do it and how do you do it at the most reasonable cost.

MR. LOVE: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This is not the first time this has come up, and it ain't going to be the last time.

And I have found in the past that sometimes that the estimates that companies come up with are pretty heavy in the front end, and when they actually have to get down to doing it it's not nearly as heavy.

MR. LOVE: I thought that would be the case here to be sure.

THE COURT: And I think that the general tendency that I've experienced in dealing with electronic discovery in this area and in general is that the IT people in-house manage to see great bogeymen in the cost department. So you're bound to have some experience along that line.

So, okay, you want 24-month frozen scan data in electronic format and agreement on the search criteria.

Mr. Bennett, what do you say about that?

MR. BENNETT: Judge, this is the first time that they have made that offer.

THE COURT: I don't need anything.

MR. BENNETT: That would be (A), Judge. That

1 is option A. And if that is what they are willing to 2 do, then that's agreeable to us. We certainly disagree that there's any out of ordinary expense or 3 costs, and, again, our disagreement is based on 4 evidence, not on supposition. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Have you all not then 7 talked about search criteria because it hadn't gotten to you yet? 8 9 MR. BENNETT: That's correct, Judge. 10 (Mr. Pittman is joining the conference call.) 11 THE COURT: All right. So you'd have to define the 24-month period, and that's basically the 12 13 class period, isn't it? MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir, that is the class 14 period. 15 THE COURT: What is the frozen scan data? 16 What does that mean? One month, one time? 17 MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir. Each month is 18 19 archived. 20 THE COURT: So you're doing one for each month. 21 22 MR. LOVE: Under an individual consumer's 23 file at a point in time. Generally once a month. 24 THE COURT: All right. Well, it seems to me

you-all ought to be able to work that out.

25

MR. LOVE: The issues, Your Honor, to negotiate, and certainly we're willing to continue our negotiations over the 24 months of scans with plaintiff, the issues are costs, which we've talked about, time, even if the search criteria -- even if an agreement can be reached on search criteria to generate this data, Equifax estimates that it could take months to generate this data.

So there's the cost, there's the time, and the search criteria.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Love, let me tell you, you go back and talk to your client because that just doesn't make any sense based on my experience in presiding over electronic discovery disputes. And this is again bogeymen coming up out of the ground. And it can be worked out, but this idea that it's going to take months is really quite silly.

I have found that turning your data over to professionals results in a whole lot more expeditious work product in other cases involving this same kind of information, not necessarily this information. So I can't buy that it's a many months process. And if you think that this court is going to wait months, that's an option that we're not really going to work on. We're going to find some other way to do it.

And I'll be glad to turn it over to somebody, a third party, and let them do it with your data if Mr. Bennett pays for it. He's going to have to pay for it one way or the other anyway.

Equifax needs to have a can do attitude instead of a can't do attitude. That's the basic problem.

MR. LOVE: Your Honor, I understand what the Court's saying and I'm not going to argue with that. It's really a technological issue, not a human resource issue, but I understand what the Court is saying.

THE COURT: I understand what you're talking about. Technology exists to do this kind of thing.

Mr. Bennett, what do you have in the way of an estimate of time and cost?

MR. BENNETT: Well, Judge --

THE COURT: If anything.

MR. BENNETT: -- I don't have much except that this same argument is made in every individual case where Equifax has for years until at least we started serving discovery requests and saying, Well, then give us the details as to why it takes so long and why it costs so much, and we've never heard this argument again until this case.

what we're going to have in this case, and that is if there's an issue respecting that it takes so much time and it costs so much money, we're going to have a detailed explanation of why that is so under oath in such a way as these people will take seriously what it is that they're doing in telling the Court that it takes time and it takes money.

I know it takes time. I know it takes money. The question is: How much of each? And it has been my experience that when people have to provide something that they are accountable for in court, the information becomes much more focused, the cost becomes less, and the time becomes less.

Equifax can either do it the easy way or the hard way. And it's going to be up to you, Mr. Love.

I think you-all need to talk about this a little further, don't you?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Given that this just came up.

But just understand, Mr. Love, that whatever you say is the cost, whatever you say is the time, it's going to have to be backed up by somebody under oath with figures, and they can't have months or weeks to put it together. This is not a difficult process.

MR. LOVE: Yes, Your Honor. We will confer further with Mr. Bennett on this issue.

THE COURT: And if I get put to it, I'm just going to let Mr. Bennett hire an expert, and I'm going to require you to turn over the data and let the expert formulate the process to get it done simply and to save your client the money that it ought to be trying to save itself.

Mr. Bennett, you need to be reasonable in the search criteria as well.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I expect you-all to talk about it. Also with this revision. I'd like to have another notice. I'd like to have all that by the end of next week. I'd like to have the plan for how we're going to do the class list and the notice by the end of next week. That would be Friday. On what day is that?

MR. GOHEEN: Friday the 13th, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's a bad date.

MR. GOHEEN: Yeah, how about Saturday, the $14^{\mbox{th}}$?

THE COURT: How about the 12th, Thursday the 12? All right.

And I'm inclined that then we will have a

discovery schedule about the type that is outlined in the plaintiff's filing. Why do you need all these interrogatories and depositions, Mr. --

MR. BENNETT: Well, Judge, the interrogatories are because we're going to have to deal with a range of different issues that -- liability, the reasonable procedures issues, the uniformity of those issues that the defendant continues to oppose, and then willfulness.

The interrogatories, we believe, Judge, provide a more effective tool to avoid, you know, often, I don't want to the say fishing expedition, although it's proper, but a wider net of deposition attempts. So the interrogatories, they're not terribly burdensome for -- this is a class action, it's been certified, that alleges a multimillion dollar exposure by the defendant, and for this defendant to have to answer 45 interrogatories is not unduly burdensome.

THE COURT: Mr. Goheen.

MR. GOHEEN: My proposal, Your Honor, would be why don't we go with the standard of 25 and 10, and if Mr. Bennett believes he needs more and can establish the standard for it, let's address it at that time, but I think a blank check for almost twice

the number of interrogatories, and then 50 percent more on depositions when there's already been an initial phase of discovery just seems, without any other basis, just seems improper at this point.

MR. BENNETT: Judge, there are already remedies under the federal rules if we ask interrogatories that are not reasonably calculated to advance the ball in this case, and we also have an obligation to continue to meet and confer. And to Equifax's credit, in discovery it does that. We do that. And so it's -- you don't give anybody a blank check to go off reservation on any of this stuff, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOHEEN: I take that back. You're right. I shouldn't have said it in that way. I apologize to you, Mr. Bennett, and to the Court, but my point was it seems, based only on what Mr. Bennett just said, and that's the only thing we've heard as to why he may need extra interrogatories, it just seems a little premature to allow that.

THE COURT: All right. I understand.

I think that in a case like this 45 interrogatories and 15 depositions is not in concept unusual, nor is it burdensome, nor should it be

unexpected, but I also think this, that you're best able do that by receiving the 45 interrogatories and looking at the depositions that are proposed to be made, and then if there's a problem, you can bring it to me. And if they are overreaching, I'll deal with that. If they are not, Mr. Goheen, then you won't even be here at all. But the door will be open for you to address this in a more specific context.

MR. GOHEEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then you-all can work that out.

I think right now haven't we done about all we can do right now or is there anything else we need to do right now?

MR. BENNETT: I think that's all, Judge.

THE COURT: I will talk to you. I was proposing to set a trial date. I actually was proposing to set the trial date in either February or March, but I need to look at some other things that are developments that are happening on my docket in order to make a proposal, in other words, to talk to you all if it's going to be a week long case.

So the question is: Have you all talked about a trial date so I can take that into account in my planning as well?

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is Leonard

Bennett. We've talked about a schedule that the parties have agreed to. We've not talked about a specific trial date, but we have talked about a schedule that would place this trial in that same time period.

I think the current proposal of the plaintiff was the discovery would end in December. We are not opposed to defendant's idea that before Your Honor sets a specific trial date that you have an opportunity to receive summary judgment motions from the parties and that the trial date would be set after that.

Our initial proposal conformed more to what the ordinary custom in this courthouse is, which is to set a trial date, and then track back from that for a dispositive motions deadline, but given the significance of the case, Judge, I don't believe the defendant's position is unreasonable, but certainly we would accommodate whichever the Court's preference would be.

THE COURT: What about the notice? Do we have to send out another notice of the trial date?

MR. BENNETT: No, sir. The proposed notice that we have says the trial date will occur on or after this particular date, but they're not obligated

to receive direct notice or mail notice of an exact trial date. And, in fact, Your Honor has discretion to move dates going in the future.

THE COURT: Yes. Well, I need to assess what's going on in some other cases that have some priority over yours, but I'm looking at either February or March and a pretrial conference ahead of that by about 30 days. So we'll see. I'll go from there. All right. And we'll decide. But I'll certainly talk with you-all before any trial date is set.

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

MR. GOHEEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to deal with today? All right. Then we need to get back together then and see where we are as of May the 12th. So you're going to have all that done by May the 13th?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Why don't we have a report from you-all on May the 16th at 10 o'clock in the morning. Is that okay?

MR. GOHEEN: Did Your Honor say 10 o'clock in the morning?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOHEEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we may know by then what the Fourth Circuit's done, too. But if we don't, we're in a position that we can move forward.

It is not my belief that it's appropriate once the Fourth Circuit grants an appeal of this issue, if they do, to be proceeding with expensive discovery. So I'd like to see where we are and keep a close watch on this matter so we don't trench on what you-all are doing with the Court of Appeals or cost anybody any unnecessary money.

MR. GOHEEN: This is Barry Goheen. Will this also be a telephonic report on the 16th?

THE COURT: I think so. And I'll receive a status report on the afternoon of the 13th by fax.

All right?

MR. BENNETT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. You can either file a joint one or you can each file your own.

Anything else that needs to be done, gentlemen? All right. Thank y'all a lot.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Bye.

(The proceedings were adjourned at 2:43 p.m.)

I, Diane J. Daffron, certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes. /s/ DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR, CCR DATE